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ABSTRACT 
This study uses Gramscian hegemony theory and the social movement approach to cooperative development to 
investigate the cooperative development gap that opened up between the provinces of Québec and 
Saskatchewan from 1980 to 2010. First, provincial sector growth is compared across several indices to 
establish this gap’s empirical scope and scale. Second, historical research and fieldwork findings are used to 
illuminate the gap’s origins and its historical significance. The article concludes that the development gap has 
been largely driven by bloc formation and dissolution—the historic erosion of Saskatchewan’s traditional, 
agrarian-cooperative bloc and the renewal and expansion of Québec’s social economy bloc. 
 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cette étude utilise la théorie de l’hégémonie de Gramsci et la méthode par le mouvement social pour le 
développement des coopératives afin d’enquêter sur l’écart qui s’est creusé entre les provinces du Québec et 
de la Saskatchewan de 1980 à 2010 en ce qui a trait au développement des coopératives. Tout d’abord, pour 
établir la portée et l’échelle empiriques de cet écart, cette étude compare la croissance de ce secteur entre les 
deux provinces. Ensuite, l’origine de l’écart et sa signification historique sont mis en lumière grâce aux 
recherches historiques et aux conclusions tirées de l’étude sur le terrain. Finalement, il est conclut dans cet 
article que l’écart de développement a été majoritairement créé par la formation et la dissolution de blocs – 
l’érosion par le temps du bloc coopératif agraire traditionnel de la Saskatchewan ainsi que le renouveau et 
l’expansion du bloc d’économie sociale du Québec. 
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INTRODUCTION: MAKING SENSE OF GLOBALIZATION ERA CO-OPERATION 
The 1980s ushered in a volatile period of global market restructuring and neo-liberal policy reform (Marchak, 
1991). It also signalled a brave new world of structural instability for Canadian cooperatives. As businesses, many 
had to adjust to new competitive and regulatory environments. As democratic associations, all Canadian 
cooperatives contended with fundamental shifts in the social, cultural, and political terrains on which they found 
themselves manoeuvring (Coleman, 2004). This was a significant and turbulent transition in the history of 
Canadian co-operation—filled with promise, peril, and lessons for the future. 
 
Paradoxically, while vast sections of Saskatchewan’s movement would go bust in the wake of globalization—
with de-mutualizations in dairy, poultry, and grains (Fulton and Hueth, 2009), co-operation in Québec boomed. 
The province doubled its number of cooperatives—which had been a century in the making—in only two 
decades (Co-operatives Secretariat, 1986; 2006). This study compares these dramatically contrasting 
experiences, presenting evidence of the “cooperative development gap” that opened up between these 
provinces, and discussing the roots of their contradictory development paths. Drawing on Gramsci’s (1971a) 
theory of ideological hegemony, these cases are analyzed in terms of the development coalitions or “historical 
blocs” underpinning these movements—agrarian, disarticulated, and eroding in the case of Saskatchewan but 
urbanized, renewed, and expanding in Québec. 
 
However, this study’s implications go well beyond these provinces. With Saskatchewan lagging the national 
average by an almost 6:1 ratio in new cooperative formations from 1985 to 2005 but Québec more than 
doubling pan-Canadian performance (Co-operatives Secretariat, 1987; 2008), these movements now represent 
opposite extremes—they are outlier cases of extraordinary movement degeneration and regeneration 
respectively. Their dramatically diverging fortunes in the globalization era thus also present a natural experiment 
for investigating why—in some times, places, and stages in their life-cycles—some cooperative movements 
decline while others prosper. 
 
 
THEORY AND METHODS 
This study’s objective is thus two-fold: to establish the empirical scope, scale, and pace of movement 
divergence; and to assess the role of bloc formation (and dissolution) in this development gap. 
Mixed methods are employed. First, cross-provincial, baseline data are used to compare trends in the number 
of cooperatives and their memberships, revenues, and assets. The study also compares twenty- and five-year 
trends—to gauge the accelerating pace of divergence. Nation-wide “Top Fifty” rankings index the role of 
dominant players in overall movement resilience while the growth of emerging service cooperative sectors 
benchmark the movements’ evolving capacity to innovate, broaden-out, and regenerate. Since quantitative 
measures can describe but not explain this gap, historical research and fieldwork findings—based on 27 
interviews in Québec and Saskatchewan conducted during 2009 and 2010—further explore its historical 
significance.  
 
Theoretically, this study draws on the social movement approach to cooperative development (Develtere, 1996; 
Fairbairn, 2001). Develtere (1996) argues “co-operatives cannot be analyzed as distinct social movements,” 
because “it is (their) relationship with other social movements which to a great extent accounts for the diversity 
and scale of co-operative activity” (p. 28). For example, parent movements or patrons may be religious, 
nationalist, farmer-based, labour-led, or socialist. In this conception, the development potential of cooperative 
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movements will rise and fall with the mobilizing potential of their extended social movement families. Indeed, 
Fairbairn (1994) argues that wider social movement ties nurtured the very roots of the modern cooperative 
movement: 
 
It is … reasonable to say that the forces of poverty and need inspired the formation of the 
Rochdale cooperative. But they did so somewhat indirectly, mediated by the agency of 
idealism and critical social thought, and by the activists of Owenism, Chartism, and other 
social movements. The Rochdale Pioneers did not rise spontaneously from need, but were 
organized consciously by thinkers, activists, and leaders who functioned within a network of 
ideas and institutions. The same can probably be said of all successful co-operatives in all 
times and places: they arise from need–when some activists, institutions, or agencies 
consciously promote and organize them. (p. 4) 
 
This article’s emphasis on the role of social movements in the construction of viable cooperative blocs rejects 
economic determinism (Gramsci, 1971a), and the notion that globalization is a monolithic, market-driven 
process with universal, mechanical, or predictable consequences for co-operation. Instead economic life is 
viewed as also shaped by the social action of actively contending and evolving historical blocs. Carroll and 
Ratner (1989) define an “historical bloc” as “a strategic alignment of classes, class fractions and popular 
groupings whose interests and outlook are realized within the project and whose coalescence establishes an 
organic relation between (the economic) base and (the ideological-cultural) superstructure” (p. 30).  
 
A Gramscian approach thus re-centres movement agency—what George Keen called the “associative 
intelligence” (cited in MacPherson, 1979, p. 28) of popular movements. It emphasizes the deep social 
embeddedness of democratic economic action (Granovetter, 1992; Bourdieu, 2005), including the vital role of 
ties to the extended social movement families of ‘co-operation’ (Develterre, 1996; Fairbairn, 2001), and activists’ 
efforts to articulate a coherent and compelling vision that can unify and mobilize an historic bloc.  
 
For example, a Gramscian approach enables us to better understand the embeddedness of early cooperative 
movements in historical blocs: on the Prairies, it situates the campaign for wheat pooling under agrarian settler 
hegemony, the farmers’ movement, and the emergence of agrarian socialism (Lipset, 1959); in Québec, it 
highlights clerical hegemony, petit-bourgeois anti-urbanism, and defensive nationalism in the early strivings of the 
Mouvement Desjardins. As this study demonstrates, movement fates continue to rest on the erosion or renovation 
of the historical blocs within which they are embedded (Vaillancourt, 2009). 
 
MEASURING THE COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT GAP 
Established sector strengths 
Since Québec’s population dwarfs Saskatchewan’s by a ratio of about 7.5:1, per capita figures provide more 
meaningful comparisons. Table 1 compares each sector’s contribution to its provincial economy in 2007. While 
Saskatchewan’s consumer-dominated movement generates 50% more jobs than Québec, as a share of their 
provincial labour forces, Québec’s sector is led by long-established and enduring agricultural cooperatives. Its 
financial services giant, Desjardins, also has a three decade head start on Saskatchewan’s credit unions. As a 
result, the Québec movement has accumulated 73% more working capital than Saskatchewan’s on a per capita 
basis. Far from marginal curiosities—and despite the globalization-era de-mutualizations of leading Prairie 
agricultural cooperatives like the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP or the Pool), DairyWorld, and Lilydale 
(Fulton and Hueth, 2009) and the collapse of Québec’s industrial credit union (caisse d’économie), fishery, and 
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consumer cooperative federations (Lévesque, 1990)—these movements continue to provide significant 
foundations for their provinces’ mixed economies. Québec’s sector generates over double the pan-Canadian 
movement’s employment as a share of its total labour market. Saskatchewan generates triple the nation-wide 
proportion. Similarly, Québec has generated almost double the per capita wealth built up by the movement 
nation-wide. Saskatchewan has created well over double the cross-Canada per capita share. 
 
Table 1. Total cooperative sector comparison: Québec, 
Saskatchewan, and Canada, 2007 
 
 Québec Saskatchewan Canada 
Jobs (2007) 73,846 14,409 142,928 
Jobs per capita (total labour 
force, seasonally adjusted) 
.02  .03 .008 
Assets (2007) $99.7 billion $15.6 billion $228 billion 
Assets per capita $12,969 $15,600 $6,924 
 
Non-financial cooperatives 
A comparison of Canada’s top fifty non-financial cooperatives from 2007 further indicates established sector 
strength in Québec and Saskatchewan (see Table 2). Of Canada’s leading cooperatives, Saskatchewan 
accounts for seven (or 14%) of the top tier cooperatives. Québec accounts for 13 or (26%). While the combined 
populations of these provinces account for only 26% of the nation’s overall population, their cooperatives 
comprise a full 40% of the nation’s top 50 non-financial cooperatives. The development paths of these 
cooperative provinces diverge sharply from pan-Canadian norms. The location of top ranked cooperatives 
drives considerably greater sector employment, revenue, and wealth creation in these provinces. These historic 
achievements have also established a stronger hegemonic position for cooperative enterprise in the political 
and economic cultures of these provinces. 
Table 2. Top 50 Non-financial co-op comparisons: Québec, 
Saskatchewan, and Canada, 2007 
 Québec Saskatchewan Canada 
Top ranking Canadian cooperatives 26% (13) 14% (7)  -- 
Percent of Canadian population 23 3  -- 
Top cooperatives (%) to population 
ratio 
1.1 4.7  -- 
Revenue  $7.3 billion $6.8 billion $21.2 billion 
Revenue per capita $973 $6800 $645 
Assets  $2.6 billion $3.4 billion $8.5 billion 
Assets per capita  $347 $3400 $258 
Full time employment 18,281 4,184 30,341 
Full time per capita (total labour 
force, seasonally adjusted)  
.004 .008 .002 
Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (2007), Statistics Canada (2007) 
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These rankings also illustrate the long-range comparative structure of the two provinces’ sectors—and the 
dramatically shifting base of co-operation in Saskatchewan. For example, Québec’s dominant “old co-
operatives,” with one exception, are primarily agricultural. In contrast, Saskatchewan had lost its leading 
producer cooperatives to mergers and privatization by 2007. In fact, all seven leading Saskatchewan non-
financial cooperatives are now affiliated with the second-tier Federated Co-operatives Limited. In short, while 
Québec successfully defended its first wave agrarian base as it diversified, Saskatchewan did not. 
Saskatchewan co-operators succeeded in establishing a second wave of consumer co-operation where Québec 
was unable to do so, but they failed to adequately diversify beyond retail, insurance, and credit in the urban 
milieu. As we will see, the rollback of agrarian producer co-operation had profound consequences for the 
Saskatchewan movement, liquidating both the economic and social base of co-operation’s traditional bloc. 
Between privatizations and broader movement degeneration, the cooperative firm model itself experienced a 
major cultural and political setback. 
 
Financial cooperatives 
Comparing Saskatchewan credit unions and Québec’s caisses populaires provides further insights (Table 3). 
Since the Canadian top-fifty list of credit unions excludes Québec, this table relies instead on provincial and 
Canada-wide statistics. 
 
Financial cooperatives in Québec and Saskatchewan rank far higher than pan-Canadian norms for membership, 
branches, and assets per capita (nation-wide data on employment were not available). The 2007 numbers of 
credit unions per capita for each province were relatively even, at well over double the Canada-wide density. 
However, Québec led Saskatchewan by a wide margin in per capita membership, assets, and employment. This 
is likely the result of the historic lag in widespread adoption of the credit union model in Saskatchewan 
(MacPherson, 1979, p. 164) and the role of a strong, unified federation in Québec. Québec has a per capita 
advantage of 18% in assets, 20% in membership, and 40% in workforce. 
 
Table 3. Financial cooperative sector comparisons 
(credit unions and caisses populaires), 2007 
Sources: Canadian Co-operative Association (2007a; 2007b); Credit Union Central of Canada (2008); Statistics Canada 
(2007; 2010a; 2010b) 
 
 
 
 Saskatchewan Québec Canada 
Members 524,840 5,500,000 10,846,512 
Members per capita         52 72 33 
Credit  unions   75 572 1,059 
Credit unions per  capita .000075 .000074 .000032 
Assets ($M) $11,248 $106,000 $209,190 
Assets per capita ($) $11,248 $13,789 $6,352 
Full Time Employees (FTE) 3,000 35,493 n.a. 
FTE per capita (total labour 
force, seasonally adjusted) 
.006 .009  
n.a.  
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Rather than a globalization-era divergence of movements, it may be more appropriate to suggest that financial 
co-operation in Québec benefited from a first mover advantage, which it continued to build on through the 
eighties, nineties, and into the twenty-first century. While the shake-out of the early eighties eliminated Québec’s 
caisses entraide économique and the Ligue des caisses d’économie (Lévesque, 1990) (ironically strengthening 
movement unity around Desjardins), the Saskatchewan movement was wracked by intra-movement rivalries to 
consolidate territories. Forced to amalgamate and merge operations in the face of rural depopulation and new 
competitive threats, regional reorganization set off a “race to the beach” to consolidate market share, often at 
the expense of other credit unions (Lyons, 2007). In contrast, Québec’s gigantic and unified movement can now 
better leverage its considerable economies of scale to build its competitive position against the banks, and 
expand across Canada.  
 
While movement unity and strong central organization have provided Desjardins with a stable, dominant, and 
profitable platform for sponsoring wider movement initiatives, the scramble of Saskatchewan credit unions to 
consolidate expanding trading areas has undermined movement stability, unity, and cohesion. Like the loss of 
the Pool, Lilydale, and DairyWorld on the non-financial side of the ledger, consolidation of Saskatchewan’s 
financial sector has done little to regenerate the provincial movement.  
 
Field effects: The foundations of movement degeneration and regeneration 
Established sector standing has played a driving role in structuring the cooperative fields of Québec and 
Saskatchewan. For, as Bourdieu (2005) argues, dominant firms can “define the regularities and sometimes the 
rules of the game” (p. 194) in a given field. While Saskatchewan failed to maintain its founding strength in 
agricultural producer co-operation, which was heavily dependent on the once-dominant grain economy, Québec’s 
strengths continue to rest largely on this historic foundation. Supported by supply management, these are primarily 
dairy, pork, and poultry—led by Agropur and Co-opérative Fédérée. Its other major foundation is the financial 
sector, led by its Mouvement Desjardins. Saskatchewan’s strengths, by contrast, have shifted decisively from 
agricultural production to insurance mutuals, consumer co-operation, and its credit union movement.  
 
The shifting foundations of established sectors have also had consequences for emerging sectors. They have 
lent movement momentum and direction to the development of new sectors in Québec while fostering neglect 
and new sector stagnation in Saskatchewan. The role of Desjardins in Québec is illustrative of this. Among 
other things, Desjardins has backed new sectors such as the Inuit cooperative federation in the Arctic and 
funeral cooperatives (Girard, 1999), taken equity positions in worker shareholder cooperatives, bankrolled a 
research and development fund for emerging cooperative federations (Diamantopoulos, 2011), and managed a 
financing pool for regional and cooperative development (Mathews, 2001). These efforts all reflect a movement 
with deep pockets and increasingly developmental ambitions. Although reminiscent of the early role of the Pool 
in broadening-out Depression-era Prairie co-operation, the demutualization of the Pool, the consolidation of 
rural retail cooperatives, and a fragmented credit union movement have left a movement-building leadership 
vacuum in Saskatchewan. Emerging sectors such as community clinics, housing, or childcare cooperatives 
expect little support from their province’s retrenching established sectors, or the under-resourced provincial 
apex organization—the Saskatchewan Co-operative Association.  
 
The fates of dominant cooperative players have had diverging “field effects” across their provincial movements. 
On the one hand, steady, incremental growth in Québec’s leading sectors—such as Co-opérative Fédérée, 
Agropur, and the Mouvement Desjardins—drove further expansion, confidence, and commitment to movement 
action. An expanding leading group thus reinforced overall sector expansion by providing policy-leverage, 
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resources, openness, and enthusiasm to new movement challenges. In Gramscian terms, the success of 
Québec’s leading cooperative brands built the moral and intellectual authority of the cooperative alternative and its 
capacity for further expansion. It helped provide solid foundations for an historical bloc “from above,” framed by the 
wider social movement resurgence of the social economy “from below” (Caillouette, 2004; Neamtan and Downing, 
2005; Mendell, 2002; 2008; Lévesque & Ninacs, 2000). In large part, co-operation forged a resurgent hegemony in 
the economic and social life of twenty-first century Québec by leveraging established sector strengths. 
 
On the other hand, the collapse of agrarian producer co-operation—signalled by the privatizations of 
DairyWorld, Lilydale, and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool—set a different pattern for the Prairie movement. The 
traditional agrarian base of the cooperative bloc had collapsed, with a weak movement transition to urban 
foundations beyond the established retail, insurance, and credit union sectors. Agrarian co-operation thus 
experienced a broad-based crisis of confidence, member loyalty, and movement agency—casting a long 
shadow over new development prospects across the cooperative field. A leading group of established 
cooperatives in crisis (and contention) reinforced broad-based sector contraction by scaling back movement 
resources for education, outreach, and development (Diamantopoulos, 2011), and retreating into a posture of 
siege management. In Gramscian terms, co-operation in Saskatchewan suffered a popular “crisis of authority”—
a sense of fatalistic resignation in the face of deregulated market forces and deepening investor-owned firm 
hegemony. Once a dominant feature of Saskatchewan’s economy and society but deeply rooted in its agrarian 
movement, co-operation’s traditional social base and claims to ideological hegemony were now eroding fast. 
 
Globalization: The cooperative provinces’ paths diverge  
These twin movements for economic democracy expanded in waves over the better part of a century, before 
their growth trajectories so radically diverged in the post-eighties period (Fairbairn, 2005; Lévesque, 1990). 
Globalization hit both provinces hard but the nature of the cooperative movement response—and the scope and 
scale of their achievements—contrasted sharply. A startling development gap opened up, a trend best 
symbolized by the privatization of Saskatchewan’s leading cooperative, the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. The 
incorporation rate of new cooperatives—and the overall number of members, revenues, and assets—all grew 
rapidly in Québec. La belle province pulled decisively ahead of Saskatchewan. 
 
Table 4. The Saskatchewan – Québec development gap: Key indices 
for non–financial cooperatives, 1985 – 2005 
 
Year Saskatchewan Québec Canada 
Rate of 
associations growth  
+ 11 % + 152 % + 63 % 
Rate of 
membership growth 
- 8 % + 106% + 98 % 
Rate of asset 
growth 
- 12 % + 273 % + 185 % 
Rate of revenue 
growth 
- 45 % + 160 % + 91 % 
                Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2008) 
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The association gap 
As Table 4 illustrates, the incorporation rate for non-financial cooperatives outside Saskatchewan was almost 
six times the equivalent rate in Saskatchewan from 1985 to 2005. In Québec, incorporations surged by almost 
14 times Saskatchewan’s rate. Moreover, while Québec posted consistent, cumulative gains in new 
cooperatives, Saskatchewan's growth slowed in the late nineties. In the first five years of the twenty-first 
century, the number of Saskatchewan cooperatives actually fell by 15%. The divergence is even starker when 
inter-provincial trends in membership, earnings, and assets are compared. In all three categories, 
Saskatchewan’s sector actually contracted from 1985 to 2005. Meanwhile, Québec posted triple digit growth 
rates in all categories. 
 
The membership gap 
Membership in Saskatchewan’s non-financial cooperatives dropped by 8% from 1985 to 2005. This contrasts 
sharply with Québec and pan-Canadian norms, where membership roughly doubled. In part, the stark reversal 
of co-operation’s historic expansion in Saskatchewan reflects the corporate rationalization of agriculture, rural 
depopulation, the privatization of dairy and poultry, and the pruning of the rural retail store network. Mostly, it 
reflects the loss of 35,000 SWP members (Co-operatives Secretariat, 2004). Meanwhile the Québec 
cooperative movement developed diverse new worker-led sectors of movement activity including worker 
cooperatives, worker-shareholder cooperatives, and multi-stakeholder or “solidarity” cooperatives. Table 4 
illustrates this widening membership gap. 
 
The asset gap 
The contrast in non-financial cooperative assets between the two provinces is greater still. From 1985 to 2005, 
Saskatchewan’s asset base contracted by 12%, as dairy and poultry facilities were transferred to new owners, 
abandoned rural stores were written off, and $700 million in SWP assets were transferred to the investor-owned 
Viterra (Co-operatives Secretariat, 2004). During the same period the influx of new investment to its start-ups 
drove the Québec sector’s assets to almost quadruple. Much of this new capital came from pools of “solidarity 
finance” developed since the eighties to finance cooperative and social economy enterprises. While neither the 
Saskatchewan movement nor its potential allies dedicated funds to cooperative development, in Québec the 
sector, labour movement, state, and even the private sector helped build up combined investments of $1.3 billion 
for the social economy (Notwell, Reynolds, & Katz, 2010). Table 4 illustrates this widening capitalization gap. 
 
The revenue gap 
Finally, as Table 4 also demonstrates, the starkest indicator of the reversal in sector growth in Saskatchewan 
can be found in declining revenues. The drop-off in this index over two decades is an unsettling 45%. This 
compares to Québec’s sector, which more than doubled its revenues. Once again, the loss of $1.4 billion in 
SWP receipts (Co-operatives Secretariat, 2004) illustrates the magnitude of the impact of SWP’s loss to the 
Saskatchewan sector. 
 
 
 
Diamantopoulos (2011) 
 
 
 
14 
The development gap widens, 2000 – 2005 
A further concern for Saskatchewan co-operators is the acceleration of declining memberships, assets, and 
revenues from 2000 to 2005 (Table 5). Since 2004 is the last year the Co-operatives Secretariat lists the SWP 
as a cooperative, its privatization accounts for much of this sector contraction. Set in motion in 1996 and 
formally completed in 2007, the SWP was a casualty of the farm crisis. It required huge capital investments to 
modernize but faced a run on member capital as a generation approached retirement. But its privatization also 
provided powerful reinforcement to the vicious downward spiral that engulfed globalization-era co-operation in 
Saskatchewan. In the wake of the collapse of the province’s first, largest, and most iconic cooperative, the 
Saskatchewan Co-operative Association was also destabilized. It lost a leading member. It lost dues. It lost 
momentum. And it lost authority and influence with successive Provincial Governments (Diamantopoulos, 
2011). The loss of the Pool was as damaging to Saskatchewan’s movement as the loss of Desjardins might 
have been to Québec’s movement. 
 
Table 5. The Saskatchewan – Québec development gap widens:  
Indices of Saskatchewan sector contraction, 2000 – 2005 
 
Saskatchewan 
indices 
20-yr trend                        
(1985 - 2005) 
5-yr trend              
(2000 - 2005) 
Number of co-ops + 11 % - 15 % 
Membership - 8 % - 10 % 
Assets - 12 % - 59 % 
Revenue - 45 % - 62 % 
          Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2008) 
 
Moreover, this body blow came together with demutualizations in dairy and poultry (Fulton and Hueth, 2009), 
and in the wake of the longer-range culling of movement-building tools like the Federated Co-operatives’ 
Member Relations Division and the Co-operative Consumer newspaper that were discontinued in 1982 
(Fairbairn, 1989); the Province’s Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development in Regina (Argue, 
1992) and the movement’s Co-operative College of Canada (Crewe, 2001) in Saskatoon, both wound down in 
1987; and, the Pool’s Western Producer newspaper that was privatized in 2002. This was a period of phased 
but decisive retreat from cooperative education and development. The provincial sector and state each 
ratcheted down their commitments to sustaining the historical bloc on which the cooperative movement rested. 
This would prove to have profound consequences as the globalization storm gathered at Saskatchewan’s 
undefended borders.   
 
The Québec sector also faced globalization-related threats and suffered wrenching losses. In the recession of 
1982, for example, the federation of cooperative food stores collapsed. The following year, the federation of 
fishers’ cooperatives folded (Girard, 1999). The recession also contributed to the failures of a credit union 
federation and several stores. This all reduced the number of federation members of the Conseil de la 
coopération du Québec, marginalized the organization, and ended the Conseil de la coopération du Québec 
publication Ensemble! (Lévesque, 1990). Québec’s cooperative historical bloc was shaken and the legitimacy of 
the cooperative alternative itself was increasingly questioned. However, the Québec movement recovered and 
was transformed. Two decades après le déluge, Québec re-emerged as a world leader in cooperative 
development. Central to this surge were academic, state (Vézina, 2001), and social movement (Beaulieu, 2009; 
Neamtan, 2004, 2008) ties that helped drive a culture of social innovation toward new cooperative development. 
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Propelled by a modernizing leadership group—many of whom were veterans of the sixties Quiet Revolution—
Québec’s historical bloc was effectively repaired, renovated, and expanded. 
 
The cooperative innovation gap 
While trends vary from category to category, the overall tendency is clear: development momentum moved 
decisively to Québec in the nineties. The case of the service cooperative sector provides evidence for this 
widening innovation gap. It also demonstrates the importance of broadening-out to effective movement renewal. 
For while old cooperative sectors may decline and some cooperatives will invariably fail, it is the development of 
cooperatives in new sectors of activity—often using new models and appealing to new constituencies—that hold 
out the promise of countervailing this sector contraction, and regenerating the movement. 
 
Table 6. Comparative numerical (and percentage) growth 
in selected service cooperative sectors in Saskatchewan, 
Québec, and Canada, 1995 – 2005 
   Source: Co-operatives Secretariat (1997, 2002, 2008) 
 
The failure to expand service co-operation illustrates that globalization shocks did not spark another historic 
broadening-out of the movement, as the Great Depression had once mobilized Pool field-men and local 
committees to organize retail, credit, and later insurance sectors (G. Fairbairn, 1984; Fairbairn, 2005; 
MacPherson, 1979) across their rural networks. Instead, this period saw the retrenchment, then collapse of the 
Pool, and a degeneration of movement energy, organizing skills, and vision (Diamantopoulos, 2011). Prairie co-
operation thus faced a sticky demographic succession from its traditional, rural base to a wider movement 
community. 
 
Explaining the cooperative development gap 
The above discussion has established the empirical reality of movement divergence since 1980. There is ample 
room for varied interpretation of these facts, but the evidence of a wide and widening gap is clear and 
overwhelming. In Saskatchewan, the evidence suggests that the collapse of the formerly leading segment of 
middle farmers in the traditional agrarian bloc (Stirling, 2001) was coupled with a failure to involve new social 
groups or the state in movement renewal efforts. In Québec, trends suggest a phased and successful transition 
Sector Québec Saskatchewan Canada 
Total service co-op sector + 486 (+ 40 %) + 91 (- 15 %) + 263 (+ 7 %) 
Daycare  + 4 (--) - 5 (- 13 %) + 9 (+ 11 %) 
Pre-school -- (--) - 13 (- 17 %) - 41 (- 12 %) 
Health clinics  + 8 (--) -- (--) + 11 (+ 122 %) 
Recreation + 19 ( + 79 %) - 36 ( - 19 %) - 31 (- 10 %) 
Farmers’ markets  -- (--) - 2 (- 7 %) - 12 (- 24 %) 
Arts and culture + 25 (+ 416 %) + 1 ( + 25 %) + 32 (+ 152 %) 
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from traditionally rural and Catholic roots to a strong, broad, and expanding new social and economic base. 
With support from trade unions, urban social movements, the research community, and the state, the movement 
effectively restructured and repositioned. It constructed an expanded and highly articulated social economy 
bloc. To explain this divergence in the underlying social structure of cooperative economic action, the following 
sections are informed by historical research and interview findings. 
 
Saskatchewan: Agricultural consolidation and movement degeneration 
In Saskatchewan, the powerful new economic and political forces unleashed in the eighties drove federal 
politicians to move more aggressively: to deregulate, sign free trade agreements, dismantle farm subsidies like 
the Crow rate, abandon rail lines and rural post offices, and realign public policies and programs to “let the 
market decide.” A century of agrarian agitation to protect farmers from unregulated capitalism was 
systematically rolled back (Conway, 2006). This project was as surely a counter-revolution against the gains of 
the early agrarian revolt as it was a defeat of Keynesianism and the welfare state. Nowhere was this clearer 
than in the federal government’s laissez faire commitments through the international grain wars, while Europe 
and the United States continued to heavily subsidize their farmers (Pugh, 1991).  
 
Globalization thus accelerated an already well-advanced process of agricultural consolidation. Caught in a cost-
price squeeze, farmers had to grow or die. Neo-liberal reforms sped up the trend to fewer, larger farms, and 
rural depopulation. Indeed, with the assistance of machinery and chemicals, the average Saskatchewan farm 
size nearly tripled from 1931 to 2001 (Stirling, 2001). Many squeezed middle farmers felt abandoned by their 
governments and at the mercy of the markets. 
 
But they were being squeezed by more than increasing costs and declining prices; they were also being 
politically squeezed. The social cohesion and faith in collective action necessary to mount a spirited defence 
was also depleted as farmers drifted further apart—geographically and politically—in the sink or swim new 
market culture of corporate agribusiness. While barn-raisings had once provided the iconic image of agrarian 
socialist solidarity, the new spectacle of farmers bidding on former neighbours’ land and machinery at 
foreclosure auctions better symbolized the survivalist ethos and angry right-wing populism that came to define 
the age. Globalization was both objectively liquidating the social base of agrarian co-operation by pushing 
middle farmers off the land and subjectively shifting the political culture against democratic and collectivist 
commitments. Co-operation’s traditional historical bloc in Saskatchewan was collapsing, numerically and 
ideologically. 
 
Global restructuring also drove cooperative sector retrenchment in Saskatchewan as rural retail, credit, and 
agricultural production and marketing networks now had to also ward off the incursion of better capitalized 
multinational competitors like Cargill and Wal-Mart. Unlike domestic competitors, these new challengers 
marshalled global market reach and economies of scale. Regionally rooted cooperatives had a great deal to 
fear from these new corporate Goliaths. A focus on the business-side modernization of exposed cooperatives 
was necessary, indeed urgent, in this context.  
 
However, this narrow managerial focus also distracted cooperative leaders from re-building the movement’s social 
base and cultural appeal. Rather than attempt to rally the membership and regroup the movement, established 
cooperative leaders had little alternative but to pull up the drawbridges. From 1996 to 2007, the number of 
cooperatives in Saskatchewan declined from 1,560 (Hammond Ketilson. Gertler, Fulton, Dobson, & Polsom, 1998, 
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p. v) to about 1,200, a decline of over 20% in just one decade (Canadian Co-operative Association, 2007b). 
Erosion of the movement’s own defenses—in public education, membership development, new sector 
development, and a vibrant movement culture—would prove as lethal to the future of co-operation as the rise of 
neo-liberalism and its new multinational competitors. 
 
This crisis context thus deepened already existing processes of agricultural consolidation, bloc dissolution, and 
movement degeneration. In particular, it exacerbated the principal-agent problem that set the immediate 
operational priorities of firm management against the wider interest in movement building. It was not in the 
business interests of any particular cooperative to invest in movement-building activities—such as member 
training, a cooperative press, reaching out to emerging publics, or supporting new cooperatives and new 
development campaigns. Similarly, state elites were captured by a bi-polar development model that oscillated 
between statist social democracy on the one hand and a free market fundamentalism on the other (Argue, 
1992). Neither camp seemed to appreciate the importance of also creating a supportive climate for cooperative 
development. 
 
However, cooperative education and movement building were still necessary to sustain member and staff 
loyalty, and to sustain the culture and development potential of the cooperative model against the maturing 
movement’s own entropic tendencies. Strong movement identity, cohesion, and commitment were vital, if 
intangible, collective or “pool goods” which were necessary to avoid being crowded out of the market by the 
increasingly aggressive hegemony of the investor-owned firm model. Without sustained investments in 
rebuilding movement culture, start-up rates were bound to lag. Even well established cooperatives would be 
undermined. With the collapse of the province’s major agrarian producer cooperatives, Prairie co-operation now 
faced a creeping cultural demutualization “from within” as well as competitive threats “from without.” 
 
To manage the crisis, leadership retreated into the uni-functional silos and conceptual frames of their own 
sectors. Their openness to emerging community needs and new cooperative development opportunities 
understandably withered—whether in childcare, housing, or in ‘Indian country’. With a “frozen” cooperative 
establishment, co-operation was unable to effectively diversify beyond the numerically and ideologically eroding 
social base of middle farmers. The movement’s transition to new fields of activity—such as Aboriginal, worker-
led, or service cooperatives—was blocked.  
 
In this context of a long-range farm crisis, imminent new market threats, and overall movement paralysis, 
several previously hidden weaknesses came into alarming view. These included the decades-long deterioration 
of movement-building infrastructure, including the culling of cooperative fieldworkers and cooperative education 
(Crewe, 2001); the long established over-reliance on a laissez-faire cooperative development model (Co-
operatives Directorate, 1993; 1997); and the gradual disengagement with the state and social movements 
(Argue, 1992). The sudden force of market-driven restructuring accelerated the long-range erosion of these 
socio-cultural bases, upon which the mounting of a response would now be much less effective. This delayed 
the transition to a more demographically, regionally, and sectorally diversified movement in the wake of the 
globalization storm.  
 
Just as deregulated markets accelerated the trend toward fewer and larger farms, and fewer and larger rural 
service centres, they also sped up the trend toward the degeneration of the progressive farmers’ and 
cooperative movements. For grain, poultry, and dairy producers, this pincer movement would end in 
privatization. From 1980 to 2010, the farmer-led cooperative movement of the past was dying but a new, more 
broad-based movement of the future was still struggling to be born. 
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Québec: The jobs crisis and movement regeneration 
It was persistently high unemployment that set the agenda for public and cooperative action in Québec in the 
eighties. Joblessness hit 14.2% in 1983 (Statistics Canada, 2010a). In addition to business modernization 
strategies for established sectors “from above,” pressure for movement modernization also thus emerged “from 
below”—to create jobs and expand social service provision. 
 
An energetic and determined program of social mobilization—backed by the state, organized labour, and other 
social movements—successfully built new legal, financing, and technical assistance models (Vézina, 2001; 
Côté, 2007; Savard, 2007; Neamtan, 2008) and new development coalitions, including the Chantier de 
l’économie sociale (Beaulieu, 2009; Neamtan, 2004). This modernized bloc would regenerate the movement 
and expand into new fields of activity. For example, three “new co-op” sectors that include workers in 
governance—worker cooperatives, worker-shareholder cooperatives, and solidarity cooperatives—now account 
for a third of cooperative jobs in Québec (Clement, 2009).  
 
Investments in movement-building, a program of sector-state partnership, wider social movement involvements, 
and continuous improvement through targeted research and development have each contributed to sector 
growth and expansion (Diamantopoulos, 2011). Far from the governing disinterest in development characteristic 
of the “old guard” that dominated the Conseil de la coopération du Québec (CCQ) in the seventies (Lévesque, 
1990), development emerged as a legitimate, and leading, concern of the reconstituted new cooperative 
movement. In 2005, the CCQ (now re-named the Conseil québécois de la co-opération et de la mutualité or 
CQCM) even assumed management of the province’s major development infrastructure, the network of eleven 
co-opératives de développement régional (CDR) first launched by the Province in 1985 (Savard, 2007). 
 
This network played a leading role in mobilizing the movement to create new jobs, regenerating the movement 
in the process. It brought together over a thousand cooperatives and other organizations committed to 
cooperative development as members of the network’s eleven second-tier, regionally-based development 
cooperatives. This mobilization network assisted the launch of over a thousand new cooperatives and created 
or maintained over 11,000 jobs in the past 15 years (La Fédération des coopératives de développement 
régional du Québec, 2010). By building inter-cooperative involvements at the regional level, the network built 
cross-sectoral movement cohesion, vision, and agency. From the bunkered frame of mature cooperatives—
steeped in the sectorally specific business demands of their own firms—the CDRs structured an historic 
reframing of cooperative action for development. The CDR network thus helped build a unified, modern, and 
developmental cooperative bloc on solid regional foundations—much as the caisses had once been organized 
around the Catholic parish network. 
Federated alongside the established and other emerging sector federations within the CQCM, these regional 
development cooperatives also helped redress the principal-agent problem in movement deliberations. Their 
federation creates a voice for development, providing a check against the tendency to movement oligarchization 
and the degeneration of movement goals. In other words, these structural reforms of co-operation’s historical 
bloc helped ensure effective movement modernization. As Vézina notes, by 2000, the apex organization once 
disinterested in development activity was “increasingly serving as a catalyst in penetrating new sectors when 
asked to do so” (2001, p. 144). From a reluctant development partner, the CQCM had been transformed into the 
vanguard of a developmental cooperative movement that was now strengthening and expanding the province’s 
cooperative bloc. This reflected the concerted action of reformers within the movement as well as those outside 
the movement—in the unions, the state, and after 1996, the Chantier de l’économie sociale (CÉS), a 
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development-focused network of non-profits, social movements, and cooperatives (Lévesque & Ninacs, 2000; 
Mendell, 2002; 2008; Neamtan, 2004; 2008). 
The new reality of open, unprotected markets had radically disrupted the Québec movement. Several 
cooperatives and federations collapsed (Lévesque, 1990). Yet it entered the tumultuous eighties better prepared 
than Saskatchewan. Québec movement leaders turned the crisis into an opportunity, proposing a leading new 
role for co-operation in solving the intractable public policy problem of unemployment. Since the election of the 
sovereignist Parti Québécois (PQ) in 1976, the province had faced significant capital flight from Montréal to 
Toronto (Conway, 2004). When global markets were deregulated and restructured through the eighties, this 
experience gave it an intellectual and programmatic head-start on responding to the flight of manufacturing to 
low wage jurisdictions. 
Several factors favoured a cooperative response to the globalization challenge. The PQ favoured rooted capital, 
which would not be a flight risk, and where French would be the language of work; it had successfully 
experimented with technical resource groups in housing and worker cooperative development in the seventies; 
urbanization and union organizing were advanced, particularly in Montréal; the labour movement was prepared 
to partner and to act (Beaulieu, 2009; Quarter, 1992); and there were strong extended social movement ties 
drawing the cooperatives into a wider social bloc forged in the crucible of the sixties Quiet Revolution. In short, a 
strong social movement coalition and developmental state favoured the cooperative model as a solution to the 
new problems of housing and unemployment. These fields of innovation and action were catalysts and 
templates for wider movement gains. 
At the dawn of the globalization era, co-operation in Québec was beset by the degeneration of mature, highly 
institutionalized “old co-ops,” divisions between the “old co-ops” and the “new co-ops,” and ambivalence toward 
partnership with the state (Lévesque, 1990). This internal crisis for the movement was resolved by rebuilding a 
more broad-based and unified movement. Movement entrepreneurs built new social partnerships with the unions, 
civil society, the research community, and the state (Diamantopoulos, 2011). These efforts helped co-operation 
lead the social response to subsequent economic dislocations. Under the pressures of government debt and the 
state’s inability to act unilaterally, co-operation came under strong pressure from community, trade union, 
academic, and state actors to reinvent itself to more rapidly meet the challenges of a provincial economy in 
transition. The start-up rate for cooperatives in Québec indicated a new vitality at the close of the twentieth century. 
Annual start-ups were on a very sharp incline, nearly doubling from 85 in 1995 to 169 in 2000. During this period, 
the number of jobs in non-financial cooperatives jumped 46%, compared to 9.2% for the economy overall. From 
2000 to 2006, jobs in the cooperative sector posted an additional 11% gain, net sales increased by 43%, and 
assets spiked by 57% (Finance, économie et recherche, Québec, 2003, pp. 16 - 20). This was also a movement 
characterized by significant innovation. For example, almost half the cooperatives created in 2006 were “solidarity 
cooperatives,” a multi-stakeholder model introduced only a decade prior (Canadian Co-operative Association, 
2007b). The intertwined structural crises of unemployment and a gridlocked cooperative movement in Québec in 
the early eighties had inspired a determined, innovative, and durable movement resurgence. 
CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX OF GLOBALIZATION ERA CO-OPERATION 
The above survey demonstrates that Québec’s cooperative movement decisively expanded its position in the 
globalization era while Saskatchewan’s suffered a dramatic contraction. Paradoxically, globalization-related 
dislocations both ended traditional, agrarian producer co-operation in Saskatchewan and sparked an epic sector 
expansion in Québec. 
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In both provinces, co-operation’s traditional blocs were destabilized by globalization pressures. In Québec, 
urbanization, industrialization, unionization, and the articulation of new social movement and state partners to a 
modernized bloc were crucial to movement resilience. A strong urban base, actively supportive labour 
movement, engaged research community, and developmental state helped drive movement modernization and 
bloc renewal (Côté, 2007; Beaulieu, 2009; Vézina, 2001). 
 
The CÉS represents Québec’s emerging social economy movement. It is a network of groups committed to 
taking democratic social action to achieve economic power. It exists in an uneasy relationship with the more 
formal structures of the cooperative movement, the Conseil québécois de la co-opération et de la mutualité 
(Lévesque & Ninacs, 2000). Nonetheless, this shifting and conflictual social economy bloc has consolidated the 
emergent hegemony of economic pluralism in Québec. The social economy sector is viewed as an increasingly 
legitimate and important third partner alongside the private and public sectors (Lévesque & Ninacs, 2000; 
Mendell, 2000; 2008; Neamtan, 2008; Vaillancourt, 2009). 
 
Neamtan (2004) emphasizes the strategic centrality of “cultural shifts” in this great leap forward. Indeed, co-
operation’s resurgent position within Québec’s social economy bloc was preceded, as Gramsci (1977) might put 
it, by “an intense labour of criticism,” a “diffusion of culture,” and “a spread of ideas.” Like past insurgencies 
against the status quo, the new co-operation, too, had to achieve the “ties of solidarity” and “unified 
consciousness” (p. 12) necessary to its renewed vitality. Activists, researchers, developers, and policy-makers 
in Québec struggled to define a new cooperative project, organize viable campaigns, and win hearts and minds. 
They built popular mental preparedness for the necessary “cultural expansion” of co-operation—and other forms 
of social ownership. In short, it took aggressive communication and education as well as research, technical 
assistance, political alliances, and new institutional intermediaries to reassemble a viable historical bloc for this 
new co-operativism. 
 
By contrast, the Saskatchewan movement’s traditional base was radically and rapidly reduced by a wrenching 
agricultural consolidation in this period. While 61% of its residents lived on farms in 1931, this dropped to less 
than 12% by 2006—reducing the province’s farm population from a decisive majority to a very slim minority in 
the span of a lifetime (Statistics Canada, 2009). This reflected an economic shift to larger farms, but also the 
increasing marginalization of agriculture by the resource and industrial sectors. From 1984 to 1997 agriculture 
accounted for 10% or less of provincial gross domestic product, less than mining and oil extraction and less 
than half the value of industrial production (Stirling, 2001). 
 
The collapse of the wheat province’s traditional, farmer-led cooperative bloc left little energy and few resources 
to expand the movement’s urban reach (Fairbairn, Hammond Ketilson, & Krebs, 1977; Fairbairn, 2005; 
Diamantopoulos & Findlay, 2007; Diamantopoulos & Bourgeois, 2011). Most importantly, the traditional 
movement base among middle farmers was radically reduced and its leadership undermined by their struggles 
for survival. As Gramsci (1971b) put it in another case of blocked transition, “The crisis consists precisely in the 
fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear” (p. 276). With the declining hegemony of the historic left-agrarian bloc (Argue, 1992), the virtual dissolution of 
its traditional leadership base, and the progressive dismantling of education, communication, and movement-building 
structures (Diamantopoulos, 2011), Prairie co-operation plunged into an unprecedented, rapid, and perilous decline. 
 
One final, important lesson from this tale of two movements is that it took a crisis in Québec—including 
cooperative failures, a major process of movement restructuring, and a concerted mobilization of civil society, 
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university-based, and state actors to meet pressing public needs—to set the stage for its recovery. In other words, 
it required the repair and reconstruction of its historical bloc, and the will to do so. 
 
While the traditional era of producer-led agrarian co-operation in Saskatchewan is over—at least in dairy, 
poultry, and grains—a New Social Economy (Fairbairn et al., 1997; Fairbairn, 2005; Diamantopoulos & Findlay, 
2007; Silver, 2008; Diamantopoulos & Bourgeois, 2011) is only in the early days of its struggle to emerge. 
Lessons from Québec will be useful as Saskatchewan struggles to re-invent its movement in radically new 
economic and social conditions; rebuilding on wider foundations; reaching out to an extended social movement 
family and the state; and adapting innovations—such as those developed by their Québécois cousins—to fit the 
emerging new development context. In no small measure, their task is to re-imagine and re-build a new, 
broader-based historical bloc that can drive this movement in the radically new social, economic, and political 
conditions of the twenty-first century. 
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